

Nick Hughes

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

- 2019-2023: University of Oxford, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Philosophy
- 2018-2019: Durham University, Junior Research Fellow
- 2016-2018: University College Dublin, IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow
- 2015-2016: University of Oslo, Stipendiary Lecturer

RESEARCH INTERESTS

- AOS: Epistemology, Ethics, Mind
- AOC: Action, Normativity, Rationality, Practical Ethics, Feminist Theory

ARTICLES

- 1. Against The Fixed-Point Thesis
Revise & Resubmit at *The Journal of Philosophy*
- 2. Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Forthcoming
- 3. Epistemology Without Guidance
Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming
- 4. Epistemic Dilemmas Defended
Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming
- 5. Who's Afraid of Epistemic Dilemmas?
Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. Forthcoming
- 6. Evidence and Bias
Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Forthcoming
- 7. Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy
International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 27 (4) pp. 591-596 (2019)

- 8. Dilemmic Epistemology
Synthese. Vol. 196 (10) pp. 4059-4090 (2019)
- 9. Knowledgeable Assertion in the Image of Knowledgeable Belief
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 62 (2) pp. 168-184. (2019)
- 10. Uniqueness, Rationality, and The Norm of Belief
Erkenntnis. Vol. 84 (1) pp. 57-75 (2019)
- 11. Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and the Principle Ought-Implies-Can
Utilitas. Vol. 30 (4) pp. 439-457. (2018)
- 12. Guidance, Obligations, and Ability: A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can
Utilitas. Vol. 30 (1) pp. 73-85. (2018)
- 13. No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. Vol 6. (3) pp. 157-166 (2017)
- 14. Do We Matter?
Aeon, June 2017
- 15. Consistency and Evidence
Philosophical Studies. Vol. 169 (2), pp. 333-338 (2014)
- 16. Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason That P?
Episteme. Vol. 11 (4), pp. 457-462 (2014)

BOOKS

- *Epistemic Dilemmas*: A monograph on epistemic dilemmas. In progress.
- *Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas*: An edited collection of essays on the topic of epistemic dilemmas, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. Contributors: Timothy Williamson, Ralph Wedgwood, Ram Neta, Matthew McGrath, Anna-Maria Eder, Daniel Greco, Claire Field, Clayton Littlejohn, Jacob Ross, Catrin-Campbell Moore, Mikkel Gerken, Errol Lord, Kurt Sylvan, Juan Comesana, Declan Smithies, Nick Hughes, Alex Worsnip.

EDUCATION

PhD, Philosophy, September 2010 - June 2015

- Arche Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews
- Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo

Visiting PhD Student, Philosophy, October 2013 - March 2014

- University of Oxford

Visiting PhD Student, Philosophy, October 2011 - December 2011

- Rutgers University

Master of Arts, Philosophy, September 2009

- University College London

Bachelor of Arts, Philosophy, September 2007

- University College London

AWARDS AND GRANTS

2019-2022: Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship, University of Oxford

- Value: £150,000 (approx.)

2016-2018: Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Research Fellowship

- Value: €85,000 (approx.)

2012-2016: University of Oslo Doctoral Fellowship

- Value: £180,000 (approx.)

2010-2014: Arts and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Award, University of St Andrews

- Value: £45,000 (approx.)

TEACHING: QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE (* = upcoming)

2016: *Certification in Teaching and Learning in Higher Education*, University of Oslo. A 100-hour course of lectures, discussion groups, peer evaluations, and essay writing. Designed to develop participants pedagogical skills in preparation for university teaching

2022: Epistemology *

- Undergraduate lectures (x4), University of Oxford
- Topics: The relationship between knowing and acting

2021: Feminist Theory

- Undergraduate Tutor (3rd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: What is a woman?, Feminist Epistemology, Sex Work, Pornography, Feminism & Capitalism, Global Feminism, Queer Feminism

2021: Practical Ethics

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd Year), University of Oxford

- Topics: Beneficence, Effective Altruism, Animal Rights, Predation, Affirmative Action, Racial Profiling, Medical Consent, the Non-Identity Problem

2021: Epistemology

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: Skepticism, The Nature of Knowledge, Shifty Epistemology, Knowledge & Action, Evidence, Internalism & Externalism, Cognitive Biases, Epistemic Injustice

2020-2021: Philosophy of Mind

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd & 3rd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Behaviourism, Functionalism, Interpretivism, Elimitivism, Consciousness, Individualism & Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, Perception

2015: EXPHIL03E: History of Philosophy and Science, Ethics

- Seminar Leader (approx. 25 students)
- Undergraduate Introduction to Philosophy Course, University of Oslo
- Topics: *Contemporary Ethics*: Consequentialism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics, Relativism, Feminism, Abortion, Animal Rights. *History of Philosophy*: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant

2015: FIL42000: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

- Lecturer & Instructor of Record (approx. 10 students)
- Research Masters Course, University of Oslo
- Topics: Anti-Luminosity, Higher-Order Evidence, Knowledge & Action

2013: PY1006: Reasoning and Knowledge

- Seminar Leader (approx. 15 students)
- Undergraduate Course on Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology, University of St Andrews
- Topics: A Priori Knowledge, Induction, Scepticism, Analysis of Knowledge, Introductory Formal Logic

 SELECTED PRESENTATIONS (* = invited. † = refereed. ‡ = in-house.)

2022

- University College London – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* *
- Chinese University of Hong Kong – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* *
- Goethe University Frankfurt – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* *
- IE University Madrid – *Evidentialism's Bias Problem* *
- LOGOS, University of Barcelona – *Evidentialism's Bias Problem**

2021

- King's College London – *Evidentialism's Bias Problem* *
- Jilin University – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* *

- University of Neuchatel – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* *
- University of Oxford – *Epistemic Dilemmas Defended* ‡
- Newington Green Seminar – *Epistemic Feedback Loops* *

2020

- New York University – *Epistemology Without Guidance* *
- University of Helsinki – *Epistemic Feedback Loops* *
- Inquiry Network Group – *Epistemic Feedback Loops* *
- University of Glasgow – *Epistemic Feedback Loops* *

2019

- University of Vienna – *Epistemology Without Guidance* *
- University of Oslo – *Epistemology Without Guidance* *
- University of Oxford – *Epistemology Without Guidance* ‡
- University of Cologne ‘Epistemic Conflicts’ Workshop – *Epistemology Without Guidance* *
- University of Cologne – *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *
- University of Sheffield – *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *
- Kings College London – *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *
- University of Helsinki – *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *

2018

- University of St Andrews – *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *
- University of Oxford – *Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’* †
- Humboldt University Berlin – *Epistemic Dilemmas* †
- Institute of Philosophy London – *Epistemic Dilemmas* *
- VU Amsterdam – *Epistemic Dilemmas* †

2017

- University College Dublin – *Commentary on Edouard Machery’s “Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds* ‡
- University College Dublin – *A Dilemmic Approach to The Epistemology of Disagreement* ‡
- University of Oslo – *Dilemmic Epistemology* *
- University of Leuven – *Dilemmic Epistemology* *

2016

- University College Dublin – *A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can* ‡

2015

- Harvard University – *Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality* †
- University of St Andrews - *Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: A Defence Of Doxastic Dilemmas* *
- University of Groningen – *Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality* †
- Notre Dame University *Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality* †
- University of Oslo – *From Moore’s Paradox to the Knowledge Norm of Belief* ‡

2014

- University of British Columbia – *Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason that P?*
- Barbican Centre – *Is The Self a Fiction?* *
- Praxis Studios – *Is The Self a Fiction?* *

2013

- University of Stockholm– *Consistency and Evidence* †
- University of Manchester– *Consistency and Evidence* †
- University of Edinburgh– *Consistency and Evidence* †
- University of Cambridge– *Commentary on Stephen Hetherington’s ‘Knowledge as potential for action’* *
- University of Oslo – *Commentary on Daniel Whiting’s ‘Belief, Truth, Rationality, and The Lottery’* ‡

ORGANISATION AND SERVICE

- Associate Journal Editor: *Inquiry* (Starting summer 2022)
- Journal Referee: *Nous*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Analysis*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, *Synthese*, *Erkenntnis*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *dialectica*, *Episteme*, *Inquiry*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Theoria*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, *Organon F*
- Founder, Convener, & Chair: 2019-ongoing, Oxford Epistemology Group
- Lead Organiser: 2021 Hampton Court Workshop
- Convener: 2021 reading group on ‘The Epistemic Role of Consciousness’
- Convener: 2020 reading group on ‘Games: Agency as Art’
- Founder, Convener, & Chair: Oslo House Lectures, London
- Founder, Convener, & Chair: 2018-2019 Durham Normativity Seminar
- Co-founder, Co-convener & Co-chair: 2017-2018 Bloomsbury Epistemology Group
- Referee, 2015 Fordham University Summer Seminar on Understanding
- Co-organiser, 2013 Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference
- Lead Organiser, 2012 Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference

REFERENCES

Prof. Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

Prof. Clayton Littlejohn
Kings College London

Prof. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
University of Helsinki