Nick Hughes

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

- 2019-2023: University of Oxford, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Philosophy
- 2018-2019: Durham University, Junior Research Fellow
- 2016-2018: University College Dublin, IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow
- 2015-2016: University of Oslo, Stipendiary Lecturer

RESEARCH INTERESTS

- AOS: Epistemology, Ethics
- AOC: Mind, Action, Normativity, Rationality, Practical Ethics, Feminist Theory

ARTICLES

- 1. Against The Fixed-Point Thesis Revise & Resubmit at *The Journal of Philosophy*
- 2. Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence) *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* Forthcoming
- 3. Epistemic Dilemmas Defended Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming
- 4. Evidence and Bias

 Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Forthcoming
- 5. Epistemology Without Guidance Philosophical Studies. Vol. 179 pp. 163-196 (2022)
- 6. Who's Afraid of Epistemic Dilemmas?
 Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. McCain, M., Stapleford, S., & Steup, M. (eds.) Routledge. (2022)
- 7. Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy International Journal of Philosophical Studies. Vol. 27 (4) pp. 591-596 (2019)

- 8. Dilemmic Epistemology
 Synthese. Vol. 196 (10) pp. 4059-4090 (2019)
- 9. Knowledgeable Assertion in the Image of Knowledgeable Belief *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Vol. 62 (2) pp. 168-184. (2019)
- 10. Uniqueness, Rationality, and The Norm of Belief *Erkenntnis*. Vol. 84 (1) pp. 57-75 (2019)
- 11. Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and the Principle Ought-Implies-Can *Utilitas*. Vol. 30 (4) pp. 439-457. (2018)
- 12. Guidance, Obligations, and Ability: A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can
 Utilitas. Vol. 30 (1) pp. 73-85. (2018)
- 13. No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief *Thought: A Journal of Philosophy*. Vol 6. (3) pp. 157-166 (2017)
- 14. Do We Matter? *Aeon*, June 2017
- 15. Consistency and Evidence *Philosophical Studies*. Vol. 169 (2), pp. 333-338 (2014)
- 16. Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason That P? *Episteme*. Vol. 11 (4), pp. 457-462 (2014)

BOOKS

- Epistemic Dilemmas: A monograph on epistemic dilemmas. In progress. Develops a new theory, 'dilemmism', according to which epistemic dilemmas are widespread; argues that accepting dilemmism enables us to solve otherwise intractable puzzles about the fundamental epistemic norms of belief; defends dilemmism from a range of objections.
- Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas: An edited collection of new essays on the topic of epistemic dilemmas, forthcoming with Oxford University Press. Contributors: Timothy Williamson, Ralph Wedgwood, Ram Neta, Matthew McGrath, Anna-Maria Eder, Daniel Greco, Claire Field, Clayton Littlejohn, Jacob Ross, Catrin-Campbell Moore, Mikkel Gerken, Errol Lord, Kurt Sylvan, Juan Comesana, Declan Smithies, Nick Hughes, Alex Worsnip.

PUBLICATION METRICS (as of 12th October 2022)

- Google Scholar h-index: 6
- Google Scholar citations: 153
- PhilPapers Overall Citations Last 5 Years: Top 1%
- PhilPapers Category 'Epistemology' Citations Last 5 years: Top 1%
- PhilPapers Category 'Normative Ethics' Citations Last 5 years: Top 3%

EDUCATION

PhD, Philosophy, September 2010 - June 2015

- Arche Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews
- Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo
- Awarded jointly as a 'doubled-badged' degree

Master of Arts, Philosophy, September 2009

• University College London

Bachelor of Arts, Philosophy, September 2007

• University College London

AWARDS AND GRANTS

2019-2022: Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship, University of Oxford

• Value: £200,000 (approx.)

2016-2018: Irish Research Council Postdoctoral Research Fellowship

• Value: €85,000 (approx.)

2012-2016: University of Oslo Doctoral Fellowship

• Value: £180,000 (approx.)

2010-2014: Arts and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Award, University of St Andrews

• Value: £45,000 (approx.)

TEACHING: QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE (* = upcoming)

2016: Certification in Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, University of Oslo. A 100-hour course of lectures, discussion groups, peer evaluations, and essay writing. Designed to develop participants pedagogical skills in preparation for university teaching.

2022: Epistemology *

- Undergraduate lectures (x4), University of Oxford
- Topics: The relationship between knowing and acting

2022: Epistemology

- BPhil supervisor, University of Oxford
- (Note: Oxford's 'BPhil' is a 2-year research master's degree equivalent to an MPhil)
- Topics: Metaepistemology, The value of knowledge, Disagreement, Epistemology of art, The genealogy of epistemic concepts, Inference and concept possession

2021: Feminist Theory

- Undergraduate Tutor (3rd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: What is a woman?, Feminist Epistemology, Sex Work, Pornography, Feminism & Capitalism, Global Feminism, Queer Feminism

2021: Practical Ethics

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: Beneficence, Effective Altruism, Animal Rights, Predation, Affirmative Action, Racial Profiling, Medical Consent, the Non-Identity Problem

2021: Epistemology

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: Skepticism, The Nature of Knowledge, Shifty Epistemology, Knowledge & Action, Evidence, Internalism & Externalism, Cognitive Biases, Epistemic Injustice

2020-2021: Philosophy of Mind

- Undergraduate Tutor (2nd & 3rd Year), University of Oxford
- Topics: Mind-Brain Identity Theory, Behaviourism, Functionalism, Interpretivism, Elimitivism, Consciousness, Individualism & Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, Perception

2015: EXPHIL03E: History of Philosophy and Science, Ethics

- Seminar Leader (approx. 20 students)
- Undergraduate Introduction to Philosophy Course, University of Oslo
- Topics: *Contemporary Ethics*: Consequentialism, Deontology, Virtue Ethics, Relativism, Feminism, Abortion, Animal Rights. *History of Philosophy*: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant

2015: FIL42000: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

- Lecturer & Instructor of Record (7 students)
- Research Masters Course, University of Oslo
- Topics: Anti-Luminosity, Higher-Order Evidence, Knowledge & Action

2013: PY1006: Reasoning and Knowledge

- Seminar Leader (approx. 15 students)
- Undergraduate Course on Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology, University of St Andrews

 Topics: A Priori Knowledge, Induction, Scepticism, Analysis of Knowledge, Introductory Formal Logic

SELECTED PRESENTATIONS (* = invited. † = refereed. ‡ = in-house. δ = upcoming)

2022

- Hong Kong University *Towards a Non-Ideal Epistemology* * δ
- University of Oxford *Towards a Non-Ideal Epistemology* ‡ δ
- Newington Green Seminar Towards a Non-Ideal Epistemology *
- University College London Epistemic Dilemmas Defended *
- Chinese University of Hong Kong Epistemic Dilemmas Defended *
- Goethe University Frankfurt Epistemic Dilemmas Defended *
- IE University Madrid Evidentialism's Bias Problem *
- LOGOS, University of Barcelona Evidentialism's Bias Problem*

2021

- King's College London Evidentialism's Bias Problem *
- Jilin University Epistemic Dilemmas Defended *
- University of Neuchatel Epistemic Dilemmas Defended *
- University of Oxford Epistemic Dilemmas Defended ‡
- Newington Green Seminar Epistemic Feedback Loops *

2020

- New York University Epistemology Without Guidance *
- University of Helsinki Epistemic Feedback Loops *
- Inquiry Network Group Epistemic Feedback Loops *
- University of Glasgow Epistemic Feedback Loops *

2019

- University of Vienna Epistemology Without Guidance *
- University of Oslo Epistemology Without Guidance *
- University of Oxford Epistemology Without Guidance ‡
- University of Cologne 'Epistemic Conflicts' Workshop Epistemology Without Guidance *
- University of Cologne *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *
- University of Sheffield Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt? *
- Kings College London Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt? *
- University of Helsinki *Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt?* *

2018

- University of St Andrews Are the Requirements of Rationality Immune to Rational Doubt? *
- University of Oxford Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance, and the Principle 'Ought-Implies-Can' †
- Humboldt University Berlin *Epistemic Dilemmas* †
- Institute of Philosophy London Epistemic Dilemmas *

• VU Amsterdam – Epistemic Dilemmas †

2017

- University College Dublin Commentary on Edouard Machery's "Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds ‡
- University College Dublin A Dilemmic Approach to The Epistemology of Disagreement ‡
- University of Oslo Dilemmic Epistemology *
- University of Leuven Dilemmic Epistemology *

2016

• University College Dublin – A Close Look at The Action Guidance Argument for Ought-Implies-Can‡

2015

- Harvard University Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality †
- University of St Andrews Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: A Defence Of Doxastic Dilemmas *
- University of Groningen Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality †
- Notre Dame University Epistemic Permissibility and Epistemic Irrationality †
- University of Oslo From Moore's Paradox to the Knowledge Norm of Belief ‡

2014

- University of British Columbia *Is Knowledge the Ability to Φ For the Reason that P?* †
- Barbican Centre Is The Self a Fiction? *
- Praxis Studios *Is The Self a Fiction?* *

2013

- University of Stockholm- Consistency and Evidence †
- University of Manchester- Consistency and Evidence †
- University of Edinburgh– Consistency and Evidence †
- University of Cambridge
 — Commentary on Stephen Hetherington's 'Knowledge as potential for action'*
- University of Oslo Commentary on Daniel Whiting's 'Belief, Truth, Rationality, and The Lottery' ‡

VISITING POSITIONS

Visiting Senior Research Fellow, May 2022

• LOGOS Research Centre, University of Barcelona

Visiting PhD Student, Philosophy, October 2013 - March 2014

• University of Oxford

Visiting PhD Student, Philosophy, October 2011 - December 2011

Rutgers University

ORGANISATION

- Founder, Convener, & Chair: 2019-ongoing, Oxford Epistemology Group
- Founder, Convener, & Chair: Oslo House Lectures, London
- Founder, Convener, & Chair: 2018-2019 Durham Normativity Seminar
- Co-founder, Co-convener & Co-chair: 2017-2018 Bloomsbury Epistemology Group
- Lead Organiser: 2021 Hampton Court Workshop
- Lead Organiser, 2012 Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference
- Co-organiser, 2013 Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference
- Convener: 2021 reading group on Declan Smithies's 'The Epistemic Role of Consciousness'
- Convener: 2020 reading group on Thi Nguyen's 'Games: Agency as Art'

SERVICE

- Associate Journal Editor: Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
- Journal Referee: Nous, Philosophers' Imprint, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, Oxford University Press, Journal of Moral Philosophy, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Synthese, Erkenntnis, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, dialectica, Episteme, Inquiry, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Theoria, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Organon F
- Referee: 2015 Fordham University Summer Seminar on Understanding
- Examiner: University of Oxford Philosophy BPhil degree (2021-2022)
- Examiner: University of Oxford Combined Honours Philosophy Bachelor's degrees

REFERENCES

Prof. Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford
timothy.williamson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Prof. Clayton Littlejohn Kings College London cmlittlejohn@gmail.com

Prof. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio University of Helsinki <u>mlasonen@gmail.com</u>